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SPECIAL EDUCATION
Are Courts Authorized by the
Individuals with Disabilities Act to
Award Expert Fees to Prevailing Parents?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW qf Unitcd States Supreme Court Cases, pages 382-385 ( 2006 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
The Supreme Court in this case is
asked to determine whether the fee-
shifting provision of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act,
which provides that the court may
"'award reasonable attorneys' fees as
part of the costs" to a prevailing
party, authorizes an award of expert
fees for the services of a "non-attor-
ney representative" during adminis-
trative hearings.
FACTS
In 1994, Joseph was identified as a
child with a disability and a student
who required special education
under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
Joseph completed the 1997-1998
school year in the Arlington High
School, in Lagrangeville, New York.
An individualized education pro-
gram (IEP) was prepared for the
1998-1999 school year that contin-
ued to place Joseph at the Arlington
High School. Joseph's parents, Pearl
and Theodore Murphy, rejected the
IEP and requested a due process
hearing. According to the "stay-put"
provision under IDEA, Joseph
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should have remained in his then-
current educational placement,
Arlington High School, pending the
hearings requested by the parents.
Because they were unwilling to
allow their son to remain in what
they felt was an inappropriate edu-
cational placement, the parents uni-
laterally withdrew Joseph from
Arlington High School and enrolled
him at Kildonan, a private school.
Joseph attended Kildonan for the
1998-1999 school year at his par-
ents' expense.
During the 1998-1999 school year,
the parents continued to pursue
their administrative remedies. In
July 1999, the impartial hearing
officer ruled that the proposed IEP
was inadequate to meet Joseph's
special needs. He found that
Kildonan was an appropriate place-
ment and that the parents were
entitled to reimbursement for
Joseph's tuition and the costs of a
private speech pathologist.
The Arlington Central School
District Board of Education (the
District) sought administrative
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review of the hearing officer's deci-
sion. In August 1999, while the
District's appeal was pending, the
parents filed an action in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern
District of New York seeking a tem-
porary restraining order requiring
the District to pay Joseph's tuition
at Kildonan during the pendency of
the District's appeal. The case was
then transferred to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of
New York.
Before the administrative review of
the hearing officer's decision was
concluded, a meeting was convened
in September 1999 to discuss
Joseph's placement for the
1999-2000 term. An IEP was pro-
posed placing Joseph back at
Arlington High School. Joseph's par-
ents did not accept this IEP and
continued to enroll Joseph at
Kildonan at their expense.
In December 1999, the state review
officer ruled on the District's appeal.
The review officer found that the
District had not met its burden to
demonstrate that the IEP proposed
for the 1998-1999 school year was
properly tailored to meet Joseph's
needs and that the services provid-
ed by Kildonan were appropriate.
The review officer upheld the hear-
ing officer's award of tuition to the
parents but reversed the award of
reimbursement for the services of
the speech pathologist.
As a result of the review officer's
decision, the District reimbursed
the parents for Joseph's tuition for
the 1998-1999 school year. In
January 2000, the parents requested
a due process hearing seeking
tuition reimbursement for the
1999-2000 school year, and chal-
lenging the appropriateness of the
recommended public school pro-
gram and placement for Joseph for
the 1999-2000 term. Contending
that Kildonan was Joseph's current
educational placement and that
Joseph should remain there during
the pendency of these proceedings,
the parents argued that the District
had an ongoing financial responsi-
bility to fund Joseph's tuition at
Kildonan until Joseph's placement
was changed by agreement, a final
administrative decision, or a court
decision. The District asserted that
Joseph's current educational place-
ment was the Arlington High
School, claiming the review officer's
decision was limited to the
1998-1999 school year.
Rejecting the District's argument,
the district court held that Joseph's
"current educational placement"
was Kildonan, once the review offi-
cer's decision was issued in favor of
private school placement for that
year. The court ordered the District
to continue to fund the tuition as
long as Kildonan remained the cur-
rent educational placement. Murphy
v. Arlington Central School District
Board of Education, 86 F. Supp. 2d
354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The District appealed the district
court's decision to the Second
Circuit, which affirmed the district
court's decision. Murphy v.
Arlington Central School District
Board of Education, 297 F. 3d 195
(2d Cir. 2002).
The parents wrote several letters
requesting the district court to
order the school district to pay the
fees and costs incurred by the par-
ents during the course of the due
process hearing. Included among
the parents' expenses were S29,350
in fees for the services of their
"non-attorney representative." At
the hearing, the expert performed
many of the functions traditionally
attributed to licensed attorneys,
including making an opening state-
ment, conducting direct and cross-
examination of witnesses, making
motions and objections, and prepar-
ing a post-hearing memorandum of
law.
The district court granted the par-
ents' request in part. Murphy v.
Arlington Central School District
Board of Education, 2003 WL
21694398 (S.D.N.Y July 22, 2003).
The district court reasoned that at
impartial due process hearings, a
party has the right to be accompa-
nied and advised by counsel and by
individuals with special knowledge
or training with respect to the prob-
lems of children with disabilities
and that the IDEA permits a district
court, in its discretion, to award a
prevailing party reasonable attor-
neys' fees. The district court con-
cluded that unlicensed individuals
such as the parent's representative
cannot collect -attorneys' fees" for
doing work similar to that of an
attorney but instead can collect for
related work as "expert consulting
services." Determining that the par-
ents' representative was an
'expert," the district court reduced
the requested fee and awarded the
parents S8,650 for their representa-
tive's services.
The District appealed the district
court's fee determination. The
Second Circuit affirmed the district
court, finding that the IDEA's refer-
ence to "attorneys' fees" was
intended to include reasonable
expenses and fees of expert witness-
es. Murphy v. Arlington Central
School District Board of Education,
402 F. 3d (332 (2d Cir. 2005). The
court concluded the parents were
entitled to recover the costs of their
non-attorney educational consul-
tant. The Second Circuit found a
statement in the House Conference
Committee Report on IDEXs prede-
cessor, the Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, that the
'conferees intended that the term
'attorneys' fees as part of the costs'
(Continued on Page 384)
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include reasonable expenses and
fees of expert witnesses and the rea-
sonable costs of any test or evalua-
tion which is found to be necessary
for the preparation of the ... case."
It concluded that this demonstrated
that Congress intended that expert
fees be compensable under the
IDEA. The court reasoned that that
awarding expert fees was consistent
with IDEA's purpose of ensuring that
all children with disabilities obtain a
free appropriate public education.
The District then sought review of
the Second Circuit's decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court granted the petition for a writ
of certiorari. 126 S.Ct. 978 (2006).
CASE ANALYSIS
The IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.)
seeks to ensure that all disabled
children have available to them a
free appropriate public education.
(The IDEA was amended by the
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004
effective July 1, 2005-after the
events in this case occurred.) Under
the IDEA, school districts must cre-
ate an IEP for each disabled child. If
parents believe their child's IEP is
inappropriate, they may request an
impartial due process hearing. A
party dissatisfied at the conclusion
of an impartial due process hearing
may seek further administrative
review of the dispute by the state
educational agency. If still dissatis-
fied, a party may pursue a civil
action in either state or federal
court. A court, in its discretion, may
award reasonable attorneys' fees as
part of the costs to the parents of a
child with a disability who is the
prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B).
The District argues that the IDEA
does not authorize prevailing par-
ents to recover from public school
districts the costs of experts whom
parents have paid to participate in
litigation over special education
placement. Contending that the
statutory language must be con-
structed strictly because the IDEA
was enacted under Congress's
spending power, the District reasons
that the IDEA provides only for the
shifting of "reasonable attorneys'
fees as part of the costs."
According to the District, the
Second Circuit erred by looking at
legislative intent in the absence of
any ambiguity to determine the
meaning of a statute and again by
concluding that Congress intended
to authorize reimbursement of
expert fees in IDEA actions based
on a single sentence in the 1986
House Conference Report. The
District stresses that the language of
the conference report cannot trump
the plain language of the statute,
which is silent with respect to
expert fees. Disagreeing, the parents
assert that Congress, in the IDEA's
legislative history, left no doubt that
it intended expert fees to be includ-
ed within the term costs under
the IDEA.
The parents claim that the U.S.
Supreme Court in West Virginia
University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83 (1991), looked to the
IDEA's legislative history to differen-
tiate the IDEA from 42 U.S.C. §
1988, in which there was no indica-
tion that Congress intended the
word costs to include expert
witness fees.
It is the District's position that the
IDEA's promise of a free appropriate
public education is not dependent
on parents' ability to recover expert
fees. The District points out that the
IDEA ensures parents' access to an
expert who can evaluate all the
materials a school must make avail-
able and who give an independent
opinion at the school's expense. The
District says that a holding that the
IDEA authorizes the award of expert
fees would violate Congress's intent
to focus resources on teaching and
learning while reducing litigation-
related costs.
Stressing the importance of experts
in IDEA cases, the parents assert
that expert testimony is often criti-
cal in IDEA cases, which are fact-
intensive inquiries about the child's
disability and the effectiveness of
the measures school boards have
offered to secure a free appropriate
public education. According to the
parents, the availability of expert
fees would be in keeping with the
IDEA's remedial purpose.
SIGNIFICANCE
In West Virginia University
Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83
(1991), the Supreme Court held
that nearly identical language in the
then-current version of the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1988) did not authorize
an award of expert fees because
"there was no 'explicit statutory
authority' indicating that Congress
intended for that sort of fee-shift-
ing." The Second Circuit concluded
that the Supreme Court's reference
to the IDEA's legislative history in a
footnote required it to distinguish
IDEA from Section 1988 as con-
strued by Casey. The Second
Circuit found it instructive that
after Casey, Congress amended
Section 1988 to allow recovery of
expert fees in civil rights actions,
but took no similar action with
respect to the IDEA. The Second
Circuit believed it reasonable to
infer that Congress, on the basis of
the Supreme Court's decision in
Casey saw no need to amend the
IDEA because the Court had recog-
nized that in enacting the IDEA,
Congress had sufficiently indicated
in the committee report that pre-
vailing parties could recover expert
fees under IDEA.
Issue No. 7384
Relying on Casey, the Seventh,
Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have held
that the IDEA does not authorize an
award of expert fees to prevailing
parties. LaGrange School District
No. 102, 349 F.3d 469 (7th Cir.
2003); Neosho R-V School District v.
Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir.
2003); Goldring v. District of
Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, rehearing
en banc denied (D.C. Cir. 2005). In
addition to the Second Circuit, the
Third Circuit has suggested that
expert fees are recoverable under
the IDEA's fee-shifting provision.
Arons v. New Jersey State Board of
Education, 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988).
See also Pazik v. Gateway Regional
School District, 130 F. Supp. 2d 217
(D.Mass. 2001); Brillon v. Klein
Independent School District, 274 F.
Supp. 2d 864 (S.D.Tex. 2003),
reversed in part on other grounds,
100 F3d. Appx. 309 (5th Cir. 2005);
Verginia McC. v. Corrigan-Camden
Independent School District, 909 F.
Supp. 1023 (E.D.Tex. 1995); Gross
v. Perrysburg Exempted Village
School District, 306 F. Supp. 2d 726
(N.D.Ohio 2004).
A decision by the Supreme Court
should resolve the split among the
circuits. A ruling in favor of the par-
ents may ease the financial burden
incurred in using educational con-
sultants to challenge special educa-
tion placements, but it would
increase the special education costs
of public school districts by divert-
ing funds to experts rather than
educational programs. Such a ruling
could also engender additional liti-
gation to resolve fee disputes. A rul-
ing in favor of the District would
increase the financial burden of par-
ents who use educational consul-
tants in challenging school place-
ment decisions, but it would reduce
the litigation costs of public schools.
This case may also provide an
opportunity to observe the
approaches of the justices with
respect to the use of legislative his-
tory as a tool of statutory interpre-
tation. Some justices, including
Justice Scalia, have expressed skep-
ticism over the use of legislative his-
tory. See Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts atnd
the Law (1997).
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